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The Runaway Shop
Michael Frenkel*
0 NE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS in labor law is that of
plant removal, better known as the "runaway shop." 1 Here
the applicable law is changing and uncertain, 2 yet the advisor
must be prepared to answer vital questions.
Certainly, one of the most drastic economic weapons in man-
agements' arsenal in battles with labor unions is the runaway
shop.3 This is the device whereby an employer either prevents
unionization, or escapes bargaining with an established union,
by ceasing operations at his original location and relocating in
another, usually distant community. 4 The purpose of this article
is to outline the matters which must be looked at when there is
a plant removal problem, and to state the applicable legal doc-
trines.
Industrial Migration
Industry in the United States is increasingly on the go. The
trend has been strongest in those enterprises where the ratio
of labor costs to the total cost of processing is high. In New
York, the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union pro-
vided a so called "5 cent fare clause" in their contracts as early
as the 1930's. This 5 cent fare clause made it illegal for any em-
ployer under contract with the union to move his plant outside
the 5 cent fare zone in New York City. This illustration gives
some indication of how old this problem is.5
It is relatively recently that hard goods manufacturers have
begun to take a leaf from the soft goods manufacturers' book.
* A.B., Brooklyn College; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law
School; International Representative, International Ladies' Garment Work-
ers' Union, AFL-CIO.
1 2 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 3795 (1961): "Removal of an existing business oper-
ation to another locality or a threat of removal which may interfere with
the free exercise of employees' rights. As a manifestation of the economic
power of the employer over his employees, the threatened or actual moving
of plant locations is a violation of the NLRA, if motivated by a desire to
hinder union or employee activity, Sec. 8(a) (1)." This tactic is known
in labor parlance as the "runaway shop."
2 Glushien, Plant Removals and Related Problems. 13 Lab. L. J. 914 (1962).
3 Recent Decisions, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 329 (1941).
4 2 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 4090 (1961).
5 Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., 162 Misc. 177, 292 N. Y. S. 898 (Sup.
Ct. N. Y. County, 1936).
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Keener competition and the blandishments of new communities
seeking industries have created a new problem for trade unionism
in the durable goods industries.
Labor unions are motivated by two basic reasons for block-
ing this migration to non-union communities; first, the union
wants to maintain its status as the certified bargaining repre-
sentative for the particular company's employees; second, it de-
sires to protect the job of the individual union member. Unions
maintain that the relocated company leaves to fend for them-
selves workers who are too old to learn another trade or to se-
cure another job. Such individuals find themselves stranded by
the enterprise to which they have dedicated their best produc-
tive years.7
What then are the problems to be considered? What does
the would-be plant mover have to worry about?
The problems can be divided into two principal categories:
contract problems, and the NLRA problems.s
Contract Problems
Any problems dealing with contracts depend on whether
there is (or has been) a collective agreement, and what it pro-
vides. Where we have a non-union plant and there is no agree-
ment, obviously there is nothing to be concerned about in the
contract area, whatever the NLRB problems may be. When there
is a collective agreement, the contract problems may be serious.
The terms contained in the particular collective agreement
are, of course, all important. Once in a while, an agreement may
expressly permit plant removal. On the other hand, some col-
lective agreements, especially in the soft goods industries, di-
rectly forbid or regulate plant removal (and subcontracting)
during the life of the agreement. The needle trades, as has been
mentioned, have had such clauses for decades. 9
Where non-removal provisions are contained in the agree-
ment, the risks involved in a violation can1 be great. The relief
6 Gomberg, Union contracts, 40 Taxes 153-5 (March, 1962).
7 Schneider, Vested Rights in the Runaway Shop, 13 W. Res. L. Rev. 360
(1962).
8 (Wagner Act), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) as amended by 61 Stat., 136 (1947),
and 73 Stat. 519, 29 U. S. C. Sec. 151-168 (1959).
9 Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., supra note 5.
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awarded may include large damages, 10 as well as a direction to
return to the original location.1 1 Such relief may come from an
arbitrator, 12 or from the court,13 depending on the terms of the
agreement.14
Without a contractual limitation on management's right to
choose its plant sites and to determine the need for layoffs, a plant
closing and the transfer of operations from one state to another
cannot be considered a breach of contract.' 5 Where a contract
stated that the agreement would continue in effect if operations
were moved, a United States District Court enjoined the com-
pany from repudiating the contract upon completion of a pro-
posed transfer of operations from Michigan to Georgia. 16
In another Federal District Court,17 in a suit by the union
under Section 301,18 for breach of contract, the court upheld the
union's position that the company's removal from Philadelphia
to Hanover, Pennsylvania, was a violation of a non-removal pro-
vision. 19
10 Local 149, Boot and Shoe Workers Union v. Faith Shoe Co., 201 F. Supp.
234 (M. D. Pa., 1962). Award of over $116,000 for removal from Wilkes-
Barre to Oil City, Pa.
11 Meilman, 34 L. A. R. (L. A.) 771 (1960), Company ordered to move back
from Miss., to N. Y. C., and to pay damages of over $200,000. Address-O-
Mat, Inc., 36 L. A. 1074 (1961), Company ordered to move back from
Yonkers to N. Y. C., with reinstatement to workers.
12 Sidele Fashions, Inc., 36 L. A. 1364 (1961), Company given option by an
arbitrator of returning from South Carolina to Philadelphia, or increasing
his damage payments already awarded by the amount of over $350,000
including union dues for over 20 years.
13 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U. S. C., sec. 185 (a) (1958), sec. 301 (a), pro-
vides: Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
I * . may be brought in any district court in the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties without respect to the amount in controversy or
without respect to citizenship of the parties.
14 Cf., Gregory, Labor and the Law, Collective Agreements and Arbitra-
tion, 443-96 (2d ed. 1958).
15 Auto Workers v. Federal Pacific Co., (D. C. Conn., 1955), 36 Lab. Rel.
Ref. Man. 2357, (LRRM).
16 Auto Workers v. Crescent Brass & Pin Co., (D. C. E. D. Mich., 1960),
46 LRRM 2975.
17 Local 127, Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 183 F. Supp. 588, 187
F. Supp. 509, (D. C. E. D. Pa., 1960), 46 LRRM 3003.
18 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U. S. C. sec. 185 (a) (1958), supra note 13.
19 In this instance, the court did not direct Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. to return
to Philadelphia but awarded compensatory damages which included union
dues for 20 years in the future, a total of $28,011.00, and also punitive dam-
ages of $50,000. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by an evenly divided 4-4,
affirmed the compensatory damages including the 20 years dues projection,
but by a 5-3 vote reversed the $50,000 additioh, holding that Sec. 301 does
not contemplate the award of punitive damages. 298 F. 2d 277 (CA 3, 1962),
49 LRRM 2346.
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1963
12 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (3)
In the Lincoln Mills case,20 the Supreme Court directed the
judges of the Federal District Courts to utilize their judicial in-
ventiveness, unencumbered by traditional common law doctrines,
in favoring a body of federal law to remedy breaches of collec-
tive bargaining contracts in suits under Section 301.21 Pursuant
to such a sweeping directive, the courts might make more liberal
use of the injunction in preventing runaway shops.22
In the past year or two, a number of arbitration awards have
granted heavy damages and other relief for violation of a non-
removal provision. 23 These cases point up the great danger of
moving a plant during the life of an agreement which forbids, or
may be construed to forbid, removal. This last phrase "construed
to forbid" is used advisedly. Though a contract may not in ex-
press terms forbid removal, yet a court or an arbitrator might
find from other provisions in the agreement-such as the recog-
nition clause, the seniority clause, the union shop provision or
some other clause-that there is an implied prohibition in the
agreement against removal. Such a finding could bring with it
the dire consequences of back pay and a move-back order. A
striking example is Selb Manufacturing Company v. IAM Dis-
trict No. 9.24
The courts have come a long way from their narrow views
of yesteryear, when the Massachusetts court thought so little of a
20 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448, 77 S. Ct. 912
(1957).
21 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U. S. C., sec. 185 (a), (1958), supra note 13.
22 Milk Drivers AFL v. Gillespie Milk Prods. Corp., 203 F. 2d 650 (CA 6,
1953), granted injunction where employer refused to abide by arbitrator's
award. Food Handlers, Local 425 v. Pluss Poultry, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 650
(W. D. Ark. 1958), granted injunction to enjoin employer's breach of collec-
tive bargaining contract. UAW, Local 408 v. Crescent Brass & Pin Co.,
supra note 16, application for a temporary injunction enjoining employer
from removing his plant denied because terms of contract taken as a whole
gave employer right to determine where to locate.
23 For example, Local 149, Boot and Shoe Workers Union v. Faith Shoe Co.,
supra note 10.
24 50 LRRM 2671 (CA 8, 1962). In this case, the employer had laid off his
St. Louis employees and shipped the machinery and equipment to its sub-
sidiary plants in Arkansas and Colorado. The applicability of the contract
clause was by no means evident, for it did not speak of removal but merely
forbade the employer to "sub-contract to any other company." Neverthe-
less, an arbitration panel, finding in favor of the union, directed return of
all work to St. Louis, with reinstatement and back pay to all St. Louis
employees laid off since the move. The court, recognizing that the "case
is one of much importance to the (employer)," and that the coverage of
the clause is "debatable," felt constrained nevertheless to enforce the award
under the teachings of the famous Steelworkers trilogy. The workers in
the Selb case will be entitled to their jobs and almost two years of back
pay.
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"no relocation clause" in a contract, that an employer was per-
mitted to escape his obligation under it by merely reincorporat-
ing.2 5 The court reasoned that, since corporations are distinct
legal entities, the new corporation was not bound by a contract
the union had made with the old corporation, despite the fact
that the new entity was merely the alter ego of the old.
26
Today, employers often still seek to conceal the existence of
a runaway shop through reincorporation. 27 When accused of in-
stituting a runaway shop, the corporation's defense is that there
is a distinction between the corporate entities at the old and new
locations.28 If this defense is to fail, the old and new corporations
must be recognized as a single entity.2 9 This, the NLRB has
done with court approval 30 by disregarding the corporate fiction
in order to reach the real party in interest.8 1 It has disposed of
the employer's argument by holding that different corporate
entities cannot be used to frustrate the purpose of the act.
32
Up to this point, we have discussed the risks which a firm
takes if it moves during the contract period. What happens if it
25 Berry v. Old South Engraving Co., 283 Mass. 441, 186 N. E. 601 (1933).
26 Ibid. The Court, rejecting the union's request that the corporate veil be
pierced, held that the employer's motive for reincorporating was imma-
terial.
27 Under a more realistic view of the situation, employers have not been
permitted to escape their obligations to a union by reincorporating. NLRB
v. E. C. Brown Co., 184 F. 2d 829 (CA 2, 1950).
28 Rome Products Co., 77 NLRB 1217 (1948). Taulane, The National Labor
Relations Board's Pursuit of the Runaway Shop, 7 Villa. L. Rev. 454 (1962).
29 Permissibility of Lockouts, Shut-Downs, and Plant Removals, 50 Colum.
L. Rev. 1123 (1950).
30 E. C. Brown Co., 81 NLRB 140 (1949); NLRB v. Hopwood Retinning Co.,
98 F. 2d 97 (CA 2, 1938).
31 Schieber Millinery Co., 26 NLRB 937 (1940).
32 Ibid.; NLRB v. Lewis & Levitan, 246 F. 2d 886 (CA 9, 1957), enforcing
California Footwear Co., 114 NLRB 765 (1955), employers, through subter-
fuge, moved factory to alter ego corporation 10 miles away. NLRB v.
Mackneish, 272 F. 2d 184 (CA 6, 1959), enforcing Industrial Fabricating,
Inc., 119 NLRB 162 (1957), employer intended to go out of business but
transferred work to disguised subsidiaries at another location. NLRB v.
United States Air Conditioning Corp., 302 F. 2d 280 (CA 1, 1962), employer
shut factory which soon opened again in different corporate guise; court
calls it "a classic example" of "merely a disguised continuance of the old
employer." Rome Products Corp., supra note 28, removal to another town
in different corporate guise. Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U. S.
100, 62 S. Ct. 452 (1942), facade to avoid reinstatement order is ineffective.
Occasionally, however, the employer manages to win out even though the
transaction seems to be no more than a colorable device: NLRB v. New
Madrid Co., 215 F. 2d 908 (CA 8, 1954).
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waits until the contract term has expired? Isn't it completely safe
then, at least so far as contract obligations are concerned? Until
recently, the answer would appear to have been an unqualified
"yes." Now it is more doubtful.33
The doubt stems from the famous Glidden case, 34 where the
company waited until the contract term had ended, and then
moved its plant from Elmhurst, New York, to Bethlehem, Penn-
sylvania. The contract gave workers with specified length of em-
ployment seniority-rehire rights for a number of years. Although
the contract had terminated, some workers asked the company
to honor these rights in the new plant and, when the company
refused, they brought suit. The Second Circuit, by a 2-1 vote,
held that the workers had acquired vested rights which the com-
pany was required to recognize, and that they could recover
from the company for its failure to do so, and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari on this issue.
The Glidden case has spawned a number of similar claims
which have not yet reached decision. In one case, Oddie v. Ross
Gear and Tool Co., 35 the workers relied on the Glidden case and
won in the Federal District Court. However, the Court of Ap-
peals, purporting to distinguish the Glidden decision, recently
reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that the particular
contract language and bargaining history in the case before it
indicated that an employer was not required to offer former
employees of an abandoned Detroit plant jobs at a relocated plant
in Tennessee.3"
N. L. R. A. Problems
The enactment of the National Labor Relations Act in 193537
was the culmination of a long period of development, during
which many employers had used their superior economic strength
to prevent employees from organizing for bargaining purposes. 38
The purpose of the Act was to safeguard certain union rights,
33 Glushien, op. cit. supra note 2.
34 Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F. 2d 99 (CA 2, 1961), cert. den. on this issue
and granted only as to an unrelated issue, 368 U. S. 814 (1961), and affd.
on later issue, 370 U. S. 530, 82 S. Ct. 1459 (1962).
35 195 F. Supp. 826 (E. D. Mich., 1961).
36 (CA 6, 1962), 50 LRRM 2763.
37 (Wagner Act) 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
and 73 Stat. 519, 29 U. S. C. sec. 151-168 (1959), supra note 8.
38 Cox & Bok, Labor Law, 118 (1962).
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and to equalize the bargaining power between labor and manage-
ment.39 Various anti-union measures of the employer were des-
ignated as unfair labor practices,40 and the National Labor Rela-
tions Board was established, with exclusive primary jurisdic-
tion 4 ' to handle violations of the Act.
42
Although the runaway shop is not expressly considered by
the NLRA,43 the NLRB has found this device may fall under
three separate unfair labor practices prohibited by Section 8 of
the Act.44 Plant removal intended to frustrate unionization has
been held to violate the employees' right to organize guaranteed
by Section 7,45 and therefore constitutes an unfair labor practice
under Section 8(a) 1,4 6 which prohibits employer interference
with these rights.
If a company fires one or a few employees for anti-union
reasons, this is a plain violation of Section 8 (a) (3) ,47 prohibiting
anti-union discrimination. If a company for anti-union reasons
gets rid of all its employees by a plant removal, it is surely no
less a violation.48 Finally, if an employer changes location in
order to escape bargaining with a union, he violates his obliga-
tion to bargain in good faith under Section 8(a) (5).41
The NLRB, moreover, has held that not only actual plant re-
moval may be prohibited by the NLRA, but also the threat of
39 This is the express policy of the Act, as found in Sec. 1 of the Wagner
Act, supra note 38.
40 Sec. 8 (a) of the Act lists five unfair labor practices for which an
employer may be liable. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 140
(1947), 29 U. S. C. sec. 158 (a)(1)-(5) (1959).
41 These practices can only be remedied through the machinery provided
by the Act, that is, by the NLRB. Local 586, UAW v. Federal Pacific Elec-
tric Co., 28 CCH Lab. Cas. 69, 274 (D. C. Conn. 1955); Textile Workers
Union v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F. 2d 529 (CA 4, 1951).
42 Ibid.
43 Taulane, op. cit. supra note 28.
44 NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F. 2d 477 (CA 3, 1952); Rome Products Co.,
supra note 28.
45 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended by Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U. S. C. sec. 157
(1959); see also Klotz, 13 NLRB 746 (1939).
46 Supra note 40; see also New Madrid Mfg. Co., 104 NLRB 117 (1953);
S. & K. Knee Pants Co., 2 NLRB 940 (1937).
47 Supra note 40.
48 Glushien, op. cit., supra note 2; see also Winchester Electronics, Inc., 128
NLRB 1292 (1960); Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 NLRB 1045 (1954).
49 Supra note 40; see also Tennessee-Carolina Transp. Co., 108 NLRB 1369
(1954); Schieber Millinery Co., supra note 31.
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relocation as well. 50  These interpretations of the Act by the
NLRB, which make the runaway shop an unfair labor practice,
have usually been subsequently approved by the Federal
Courts.51
At this point, we must note a fundamental distinction be-
tween the 8(a) (3) problems and the contract problems that we
have previously discussed.
The contract problems do not depend upon the motive for
the removal but only upon the terms of the governing agree-
ment; regardless of motive, good or bad, the plant moving may
offend protected contract rights. The 8 (a) (3) problems turn en-
tirely upon motive,5 2 i.e., whether the basic reason for the re-
moval is economic,5 3 in which event it is lawful and immune, 54
or whether the basic reason is to avoid dealing with a union,55
in which event it violates the NLRA.
A leading case dealing with the runaway shop resolved the
issue of motivation in the employer's favor although the final
decision to move a textile plant from Massachusetts to North Car-
olina came only two days after a union won a NLRB election
at the plant."
On the fundamental question of whether an employer may
close up shop and go out of business to avoid dealing with a union,
the NLRB has decided the answer is "no." 5 7 Just as an employer
cannot shut down part of his business in order to avoid dealing
with a union, the Board held, so he cannot terminate the entire
operation for that reason.
50 Josper Blackburn Products Corp., 21 NLRB 1240 (1940); Friedman-
Harry Marks Clothing Co., 1 NLRB 411 (1936).
51 Gerity Whitaker Co., 33 NRLB 393 (1941), aff'd. 137 F. 2d 198 (CA 6,
1942), cert. den. 318 U. S. 801 (1943); NLRB v. Wallick, 198 F. 2d 477 (CA 3,
1952); NLRB v. Schieber, 116 F. 2d 281 (CA 8, 1940); NLRB v. Hopwood
Retinning Co., supra note 30.
52 NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, 293 F. 2d 170 (CA 2, 1961).
53 NLRB v. Lassing, 284 F. 2d 781 (CA 6, 1960), cert. den. 366 U. S. 909
(1961); NLRB v. R. C. Mahon Co., 269 F. 2d 44 (CA 6, 1959); NLRB v.
Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 211 F. 2d 848 (CA 5, 1954).
54 Kipbea Baking Co., Inc., 131 NLRB 56 (1961); Fiss Corp., 43 NLRB 125
(1942); Trenton Garment Co., 4 NLRB 1186 (1938).
55 Ox-Wall Prod. Mfg. Co. v. IAM (AFL-CIO), 135 NLRB 87 (Feb., 1962).
56 Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB (CA 4, 1954), 33 LRRM 2742. The
Court's ruling emphasized that the company's business had been deteriorat-
ing for a number of years and that its managers had been seeking a suit-
able southern location for some time.
57 Darlington Mfg. Co., NLRB (1962), LRRM 1278.
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There is nothing in the Taft-Hartley Act to keep an em-
ployer from discontinuing an unprofitable operation-or, for that
matter, a profitable one, as long as employees' union activities
are not the motivating factor. Moreover, as some of the cases
show, ruinous union demands may be reason enough for shutting
down-if the employer can show that he made a real effort to
get the union to be reasonable.
In Diaper Jean Manufacturing Company,58 the Board ruled:
A manufacturer who moved part of his operations to another
city was upheld because the move was based on the city's offer
of capital for the purchase of machinery, plus other economic ad-
vantages. In return, the company agreed to hire its workers
from the immediate vicinity. It was found that the move was for
a "legal economic consideration" rather than for anti-union mo-
tives.
Contrary to the NLRB holding, no violation was found in
NLRB v. Lassing,59 where a company speeded up a planned
change to subcontracting on learning of union organizing efforts,
with the resultant discharge of employees. The court said that
the union's coming "was a new economic factor which necessarily
had to be evaluated" by the company. It is "highly unrealistic
in the field of business," the court added, "to say that manage-
ment is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably in changing its method
of operation based on reasonably anticipated increased costs."
In the following instances, however, plant removals were
held to be unlawful avoidance of unions:
In Rome Products Company,"° involving removal of a plastic
plant to another city in the same state after the employer re-
peatedly threatened to move rather than to bargain with a union
affiliated with the AFL or the CIO; In Deena Products Com-
pany,"' where there was a transfer of one department of an elec-
tric lamp plant to another location after the department's work-
ers were organized.
Another variation of the theme can be seen in Sidele Fash-
ions, Incorporated,62 where the employer, a manufacturer of wo-
58 NLRB (1954), 34 LRRM 1504.
59 47 LRRM 2277 (CA 6, 1961), cert. den., U. S. Sup. Ct. (1961), 48 LRRM
2070. To the same effect: NLRB v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., (CA 5,
1954), 33 LRRM 2847; NLRB v. Rapid Bindery Co., supra note 52.
60 Supra note 28.
61 NLRB 1951, 27 LRRM enforced by (CA 7, 1952), 29 LRRM 2624.
62 133 NLRB 49, 48 LRRM 1679 (1961), (CA 3, 1962), 50 LRRM 2957.
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men's blouses, had been in business at the same location for
twenty years, and all the stock in the company was owned by
him. In 1952, he closed his plant because the union would not
agree to a wage cut. Some seven years later, he opened a new
plant down south under a different name. At all times, he de-
nied any intentions of moving. The NLRB found a violation of
8 (a) (1), (3) and (5), holding that an employer cannot move his
shop just because he cannot reach a satisfactory agreement with
the union. He has a duty to stay at his old location and to ne-
gotiate a contract that contains better terms for him. To shut
down a plant in such a manner was viewed as a "tactic" to force
acquiescence with bargaining proposals.
Threatening Plant Removal
The most rudimentary kind of runaway shop situation exists
where an employer, faced with the threat of organized labor,
makes a statement to the effect that, "If a union comes in, I go."
A statement of this sort may or may not constitute an unfair
labor practice, depending on many extrinsic factors, the most
important of which is the history of troubled or cordial rela-
tions the employer has had with the union in the past. 3 If the
threat is "effective" it may be a violation of Sections 7,64 8 (a)
(1),65 (2),66 (3),67 or (5),68 of the NLRA.
In two distinct cases 9 it was held to be an unfair labor prac-
63 NLRB v. Reynolds Int'l. Pen Co., 162 F. 2d 680 (CA 7, 1947).
64 49 Stat. 452 (1935), supra note 45, the section states that: employees
shall have the right to self-organization to form, join, or assist labor organi-
zations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing and to engage in other concerted activities-except to the extent that
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment.
65 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. sec. 158 (1) (1958). This section provides
that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed ...
in section 7.
66 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. sec. 158 (2) (1958). An employer may
not "dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization. .. ."
67 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. sec. 158 (3) (1958). An employer may
not "encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. . ...
68 49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. sec. 158 (5) (1958). An employer may
not "refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employ-
ees. ... "
69 Sance Piece Dye Works, Inc., 38 NLRB 690 (1942); Ansin Shoe Mfg. Co.,
9 NLRB 929 (1936).
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tice for a company owner to threaten to move his factory else-
where unless a company-dominated union was selected to replace
the incumbent union. The NLRB has even held that a threat to
relocate, uttered by a company supervisor to an individual em-
ployee during the course of a discussion concerning the em-
ployee's union activities, was calculated to intimidate her ac-
tivities on behalf of the union and thus to be an unfair labor prac-
tice.7 0 An order directing the employer to cease and desist from
future threats and to publicly announce his withdrawal of the
threat is usually issued in these situations.
7 1
On the other side of the ledger, in regard to threats to re-
locate, a statement indicating an intent to relocate, made by com-
pany officials motivated by the company's weakened financial
condition, and not for the purpose of injuring a union, was held
not to be an unfair labor practice.
72
Specifically, if there is no anti-union motivation, there is no
violation. It is probably easier to show anti-union motivation in
a threat of plant removal than in a case of actual relocation, as
the threat is normally made with direct reference to some par-
ticular union activity.73 For instance, a declaration that an em-
ployer might remove his plant, during a union organization drive,
has been held to be an illegal threat.
7 4
However, an employer's statement that he might remove his
plant, without more, is protected as privileged free speech under
Section 8 (c) of the Act.75 That section provides that expressions
of views, opinions and arguments not coercive in nature do not
constitute a violation of the NLRA.
76
Plant Removal, a Tool in Collective Bargaining
When an employer fails to notify the union representing his
employees about an impending relocation of the plant, it not only
70 H. Linsk & Co., 62 NLRB 276 (1945); see also Irving Air Chute Co., 52
NLRB 201 (1943): an employer called an employee from work to tell him
that an official of the company had said that he would move the plant
before he would see the union become established.
71 Ibid.
72 Lengel-Fencil Co., 8 NLRB 988 (1938).
73 2 CCH Lab. L. Rev., op. cit., supra note 1.
74 Robinson, 2 NLRB 460 (1936).
75 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended 61 Stat. 140 (1944), 29 U. S. C. sec. 158
(C) (1959).
76 Ibid.
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indicates a runaway shop, but also is an unfair labor practice in
itself.7 7
A secret move is a violation of the employer's duty to bar-
gain, under Section 8 (a) (5) .7s The circumstances differ from the
other unfair labor practices, heretofore mentioned, inasmuch as
the duty to notify is in no way lessened by the fact that plant
removal is prompted by legitimate rather than by anti-union mo-
tives.7 Thus, even if the NLRB finds that the secrecy of the
move is not sufficient evidence of a runaway shop, the em-
ployer's failure to give notice will sustain the finding of an un-
fair labor practice.8 0
As soon as the employer has notified the union, the burden
is on the union representing the employees to initiate bargaining
concerning the impending move.8 '
If the union fails to request bargaining over the impending
move, it may be precluded from later alleging that the employer's
move was an unfair labor practice.8 2 At the same time, where
the union has knowledge and does demand bargaining prior to
the move, the employer must negotiate the plant removal in good
faith.83
Recently a revolutionary development has come out of the
8(a) (5) violation embodied in the so-called Town & Country
Doctrine.8 4 In Town & Country, an employer contracted out
work which the employees had theretofore been doing. He
made no effort beforehand to bargain about the matter with the
union representing his employees. A three-member majority of
the Board held that, even if the decision was entirely motivated
by valid economic considerations, it nevertheless constituted a
violation of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. The majority also ruled
that the appropriate remedy was to abrogate the subcontract, re-
17 Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., supra note 48; Rome Products Co., supra note 28;
Scheiber Millinery Co., supra note 31; Taulane, op. cit., supra note 28.
78 ibid.
79 Brown Truck and Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 NLRB 999 (1953); Diaper Jean
Mfg. Co., supra note 48.
80 Ibid.
81 Kipbea Baking Co., supra note 54; Auto Store Works, 81 NLRB 1203
(1949).
82 Ibid.
83 Levy, 24 NLRB, 786 (1940).
84 Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 NLRB 111 (1962), overruling Fibrebound
Paper Products Corp., 130 NLRB 1558 (1961), affd. CA 5, 1963 on narrow
ground of subcontracting in connection with 8(a) (3) violation, avoiding the
8(a) (5) violation question.
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instate the workers with back pay, and require the employer to
bargain with the union over any future decision to subcontract
the work. 5
Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court under a paral-
lel provision of the Railway Labor Act in Telegraphers v. Chicago
and N. W. R. Co. [362 U. S. 336 (1960)], the majority held that
"the elimination of unit jobs, albeit for economic reasons, is a
matter within the statutory phrase 'other terms and conditions
of employment' and is a mandatory subject of collective bargain-
ing." To hold otherwise, the majority said, would "unduly ex-
tend the area within which an employer may curtail or eliminate
entirely job opportunities for its employees without notice to
them or negotiation with their bargaining representatives."
Here we see a new concept, that there is violation even
though the motivation is economic considerations. The effect of
this doctrine, until there is Supreme Court clarification, is to sug-
gest that an employer is taking a great risk if he moves his
plant, or subcontracts his work, or automates his factory, or
otherwise displaces his workers in the bargaining unit, without
first bargaining with the union.
Remedies For the Runaway
When a potential runaway is still but a threat by the em-
ployer, the Board can easily provide a satisfactory remedy.""
Under the authority granted by Section 10 (c) of the Act,8 7 the
employer is ordered to "cease and desist" such an unfair labor
practice.8 8 Once the threat has been carried out, the NLRB is
confronted by a more complex problem in formulating a rem-
edy.8 9
The NLRA is remedial in scope.90 The NLRB, in ordering
affirmative action, cannot impose a punitive penalty on an em-
85 The three-member majority also held that in this case the motive actu-
ally was not economic but discriminatory and thus violated Sec. 8(a) (3),
too.
86 Sanco Piece Dye Works, Inc., Ansin Shoe Mfg. Co., supra note 69.
87 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended 61 Stat. 146 (1949), 29 U. S. C. sec. 160
(C) (1959).
88 NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., supra note 50.
89 2 CCH Lab. L. Rep. 3795 (1961), supra note 1.
90 Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 7 (1940); NLRB v. Grower-
Shipper Vegetable Ass'n. of Cal., 122 F. 2d 368 (CA 9, 1941), beyond the
Board's authority to order back pay to the government.
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ployer because he has committed an unfair labor practice-even
though the Board may be of the opinion that the policies of the
Act would be effectuated by such an order.9 1
In determining the proper remedy, most of the union suits
for runaway shops have been brought under Section 8 (a) (1). 92
Since the language of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act is general, many
types of employer activity have been held to interfere with em-
ployee organizations. Coercive acts or statements, or runaway
shops, or almost any type of activity which would tend to inter-
fere with employee organization may be held to be violative of
Section 8 (a) (1).93
The NLRB's choice is rather extensive. When there has been
an "effective" removal that cannot be justified, the NLRB may
order reinstatement, 94 back pay,9 5 transportation expenses,9"
reasonable commuter expenses, 97 or a retransfer of the plant to
its old location. The order is almost always stated in terms of
alternate remedies, so that the employer must choose whether he
will accept the reinstatement and back pay provisions or move
back to his old location and restore the prior status quo.29
One of the reasons for alternate remedies is the "unwar-
ranted hardship" involved in forcing an employer to move back.
Another reason sometimes given is that by forcing a re-transfer,
the employees' rights at the new location will be prejudiced. 10 0
In recent cases, through its decision making power, the
NLRB has developed the following policy: If an employer has
closed his only plant and gone out of business, he will not be
required to reinstate employees even though they were dis-
charged discriminatorily, but he can be ordered to provide back
pay from the date of the discrimination to the date when the
plant was closed. 10 1 Furthermore, the NLRB has ordered an em-
91 Ibid.
92 Berry, Runaway Shop-A Perennial Threat to Organized Labor, 37 Notre
Dame Law. 3 (1962).
93 CCH Labor Law Course 1548 (12th ed. 1961), supra note 40.
94 Irving Air Chute Co., supra note 70.
95 Bermuda Knitwear Corp., 120 NLRB 332 (1958).
96 Omaha Hat Corp., 4 NLRB 878 (1938).
97 New Madrid Mig. Co., supra note 46.
98 Klotz & Co., supra note 45.
99 Schieber Millinery Co., supra note 31.
100 Klotz & Co., supra note 45.
101 Colonial Fashions, Inc., 110 NLRB 1197 (1954), 32 LRRIVI 1302.
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ployer to offer jobs to discharged workers if he has other plants.
In the alternative, the NLRB will require him to place the dis-
charged workers on a waiting list, at other plants, for jobs as
they become vacant. The NLRB also has required him to pay
the employees' expenses of moving made necessary in order to
take a job at one of his other plants.102
If a company has permanently discontinued business opera-
tions, it will not be ordered to compensate employees for the
period subsequent to the permanent closing, the Board has held,
even though the decision to go out of business was motivated by
anti-union considerations. However, the company will be re-
quired to put the employees on a preferential hiring list and to
reinstate them without loss of seniority or other rights should
operations be resumed. 10 3
Very early in its career the NLRB adopted the practice of
directing orders to remedy unfair labor practices not only to the
employer who violated the Act but also to his "successors and
assigns." The Supreme Court approved this practice in the Regal
Knitwear case, stating that the NLRB orders may be binding
upon successors who operate merely as "a disguised continuance
of the old employer." 104
The Court of Appeals has held that the crucial question in
determining whether a successor company may be held liable is
whether the business has remained substantially the same since
the transfer of ownership. If it has, the NLRB order may be en-
forced against the successor, even though the transfer of owner-
ship was not designed to evade the order and was a bona fide
transaction carried out at arm's length.'0 5
Does the Board ever order "move back"? I cannot find an
instance where it has ordered an entire plant to return from the
new location to the old. It has, however, as mentioned before,
ordered return of some transferred operations to the extent
necessary to effectuate reinstatement. 10 6
102 Symms Grocer Co., 109 NLRB 346 (1954), 34 LRRM 1326; Bonnie Lass
Knitting Mills, Inc., 126 NLRB 164 (1960), 45 LRRM 1477; St. Cloud Found-
ry & Machine Co., 136 NLRB 58 (1961), 47 LRRM 1412; Yoseph Bag Co.,
128 NLRB 21 (1960), 46 LRRM 1279; Winchester Electronics Inc., supra
note 48, 46 LRRM 1453, 295 F. 2d 288 (CA 1, 1961); New England Web
Inc., 135 NLRB 102 (1962), 49 LRRM 1620.
103 Barbers Iron Foundry, 126 NLRB 5 (1960), 45 LRRM 1283.
104 Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 9 (1944).
105 NLRB v. Auto Ventshade, Inc. (CA 5, 1960), 45 LRRM 3010; NLRB v.
Tempest Shirt Mfg. Co. (CA 5, 1960), 47 LRRM 2298.
106 Winchester Electronics, Inc.; New England Web, Inc., supra note 102.
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Conclusion
As we have seen, there are many forms of "runaway". The
remedies available in some cases are inadequate. The NLRB's
alternative remedy solution often has proved to be an inadequate
method of restoring the status quo ante. By allowing an em-
ployer to remain at his new site, the burden is placed on em-
ployees who wish to be reinstated. Even though back pay and
travel expenses are involved, seldom will a worker want to move
1,000 miles, sever family ties, go into a new plant under strained
conditions, and expect everything to be as it was before the
plant moved. Obviously, many of the employees will choose to
remain at the place where their homes are established.
Perhaps if the courts could get into the matter before the
NLRB, in problems of plant removal, some of the problems might
be alleviated. If a union could go directly to a court, upon re-
ceiving word that an employer is moving, and get an injunction
from the court temporarily restraining the move until an investi-
gation and a court determination of the matter can be had, the
remedy problem of the already moved plant could be solved for
the employee. After all, there is no law that says an employer
must remain where he is if he has good cause to leave. Why not
let him show this good cause before he moves?
This procedure would face up to the fact that an award of
damages, which in a particular case may be adequate compen-
sation, rarely succeeds in deterring a runaway shop, and thus
fails to promote collective bargaining-the basic objective of our
national labor relations policy. Encouragement of collective bar-
gaining is better achieved by preventing "runawayism" than by
awarding damages after the harm has been done.
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